{"schemaVersion":"1.0.0","presentationVersion":"cryptosnif-2","identity":{"id":"ethereum-mainnet","name":"Ethereum","symbol":"ETH","network":"eip155:1","contract":null,"family":"platform","aliases":["Ether"],"providers":{"coingecko":"ethereum"}},"version":"pilot-1","methodVersion":"0.1.0","methodStatus":"candidate","updatedAt":"2026-10-03T12:00:00Z","readiness":"pilot","verdict":"Documented promise. Independent verification pending.","promise":"The original Ethereum paper describes programmable contracts, software that executes predefined rules. The foundation marks that paper as historical and directs readers to current documentation.","established":"The linked primary document is available. Its existence establishes what the project describes, while the operational checks remain open.","unknowns":"Current ownership concentration, privileged control powers, independently measured usage, incident remediation and locally executable liquidity remain unverified in this pilot.","consequences":"The evidence coverage is insufficient for an overall score. A documented mechanism alone cannot establish current resilience or expected returns.","wouldChange":"Reproducible network observations, current control maps, documented supply rules and independent incident records would allow the pending checks to be evaluated.","score":{"methodVersion":"0.1.0","status":"unrated","total":null,"partial":null,"coverage":0,"dimensions":[{"id":"technology","score":null,"coverage":0},{"id":"usage","score":null,"coverage":0},{"id":"economics","score":null,"coverage":0},{"id":"governance","score":null,"coverage":0},{"id":"resilience","score":null,"coverage":0},{"id":"liquidity","score":null,"coverage":0}],"missingEssential":["identity","supply","control"],"unknown":["identity","usage","token-role","supply","concentration","value-capture","control","security","governance","accountability","incidents","continuity","execution"],"criticalRisks":[]},"risks":[{"id":"coverage","severity":"high","message":"The current checks do not establish the project’s overall quality."}],"sources":[{"id":"ethereum-mainnet-documentation","assetId":"ethereum-mainnet","kind":"project","url":"https://ethereum.org/whitepaper/","claim":"The project publishes the mechanism described above.","observedAt":"2026-10-03T12:00:00Z","expiresAt":"2026-11-02T12:00:00Z","status":"verified","license":"original-summary"}],"corrections":[],"editorialArticle":{"contentId":"ethereum","locale":"en","version":"editorial-3-candidate","reviewedAt":"2026-10-04T20:56:20.384Z","sections":[{"heading":"Promise and Scope","body":"This dossier examines native ETH on the Ethereum mainnet (eip155:1) through documented mechanisms for computational fees, staking, and offchain governance. The scope is limited to project documentation and historical specifications. It does not verify current network state, ownership concentration, or live deployment metrics.","evidenceIds":[]},{"heading":"Governance Structure","body":"Ethereum.org describes an offchain governance model (discussion and decisions outside the blockchain) where proposal authors, client developers, node operators, validators, application developers, users, and ETH holders participate through discussion and software adoption. An Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) outlines a proposed change. Acceptance, implementation, and network activation are distinct steps. Developers can decline to implement changes, and operators can decline upgrades. Holding ETH does not grant a standing automatic protocol vote. The documentation cites the 2016 response concerning the DAO application as a historical example of social coordination leading to incompatible chains, specifically Ethereum Classic. This record describes the process but does not measure present influence or guarantee that contract losses will be reversed in future incidents.","evidenceIds":["eth-governance"]},{"heading":"Computational Fees and Gas","body":"Gas is defined as a measure of computational effort required to execute operations on the network. Fees are paid in ETH. The base fee is burned, meaning it is removed from circulation, while a priority fee goes to the validator processing the block. A failed transaction can still consume gas. These mechanisms describe how costs are structured but do not establish net supply changes, current user costs, adoption rates, or income for token holders.","evidenceIds":["eth-gas"]},{"heading":"Staking and Security","body":"Validators stake ETH to check or propose blocks. Misbehaviour by a validator can lead to the destruction of their staked ETH. This identifies a security role for ETH within the proof-of-stake consensus mechanism. However, these descriptions do not measure today's validator concentration, the number of independent operators, software diversity among clients, realized rewards, or overall network resilience.","evidenceIds":["eth-pos"]},{"heading":"Hypothetical Fee Calculation","body":"The EIP-1559 specification details execution gas fees. The priority fee is capped at maxFee minus baseFee. Unused gas is refunded at the effective gas price. For ongoing blocks, the target is half the parent gas limit, with integer base-fee adjustment using denominator 8 and a minimum upward increment of 1. Initial fork handling differs from this standard calculation.\n\nAll inputs below are hypothetical examples provided by Cryptosnif arithmetic (platform-mechanisms-1). They do not represent current network conditions.\n\nInputs:\nGas used: 21000\nGas limit: 30000\nBase fee: 30 gwei\nMax fee: 40 gwei\nMax priority fee: 2 gwei\n\nCalculated Outputs:\nTotal cost: 672000000000000 wei (0.000672 ETH)\nBurned amount: 630000000000000 wei (0.000630 ETH)\nPriority fee: 42000000000000 wei (0.000042 ETH)\nRefund for 9000 unused gas: 288000000000000 wei (0.000288 ETH), excluding other refund mechanisms.\n\nConversion notes:\n1 gwei equals 1000000000 wei.\n1 ETH equals 10^18 wei.\n\nBase Fee Adjustment Example:\nAt parent base fee 30 gwei, parent gas limit 30000000, and target 15000000:\nThe next base fee is 33.75 gwei after a full parent block.\nThe next base fee is 26.25 gwei after an empty one.\n\nThese figures illustrate the specification logic. No present fees or net ETH issuance are inferred from this example.","evidenceIds":["eth-eip1559"]},{"heading":"Unknowns and Limitations","body":"Current ownership concentration, privileged control powers, independently measured usage, incident remediation history, and locally executable liquidity remain unverified in this pilot review. The evidence coverage is insufficient for an overall score. A documented mechanism alone cannot establish current resilience or expected returns.","evidenceIds":[]},{"heading":"Verdict","body":"Documented promise. Independent verification pending. The available sources confirm the existence of specific governance processes, fee structures, and staking roles. They do not validate the operational status, economic outcomes, or security posture of the live network. Different fee inputs cannot establish a cost winner without broader comparative data.","evidenceIds":["eth-governance","eth-gas","eth-pos"]},{"heading":"What Would Change This","body":"Reproducible network observations, current control maps, documented supply rules, and independent incident records would allow the pending checks to be evaluated. Until such evidence is supplied, the assessment remains limited to the described mechanisms.","evidenceIds":[]}],"sources":[{"id":"eth-governance","title":"Ethereum.org: pinned protocol governance overview","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ethereum-org-website/5cae093227c2de78c827bf9afdac90adbb7ad3ea/public/content/governance/index.md","summary":"The pinned Ethereum.org overview describes offchain protocol governance: proposal authors, client developers, node operators, validators, application developers, users and ETH holders participate through discussion and software adoption. An EIP describes a proposed change; acceptance, implementation and network activation are separate steps. Developers can decline implementation and operators can decline an upgrade. Holding ETH does not provide a standing automatic protocol vote. The overview discusses the 2016 DAO response and disagreement leading to Ethereum Classic, showing that social coordination can produce incompatible chains. This project documentation describes the process and a historical example; it does not independently measure present influence, beneficial ownership, validator concentration or client adoption. It does not establish that every participant has equal influence or that a contract bug will be reversed today.","observedAt":"2026-10-04T20:49:32.882Z","sha256":"b884f8254e9b5442ba110f407924552b6bba1a857f33689ae9fd21deba3772ba"},{"id":"eth-gas","title":"Ethereum documentation: gas","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ethereum-org-website/dev/public/content/developers/docs/gas/index.md","summary":"Ethereum documentation defines gas as a measure of computational effort. Fees are paid in ETH. The base fee is burned and a priority fee goes to the validator. A failed executed transaction can still consume gas. These mechanisms do not establish net supply change, current user costs, adoption or a holder’s income.","observedAt":"2026-10-04T20:49:32.884Z","sha256":"5af7b13e15072d45f38e6fd48e414324c7229b6110d6f8f7fc14100e5153509d"},{"id":"eth-pos","title":"Ethereum documentation: proof of stake","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ethereum-org-website/dev/public/content/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/pos/index.md","summary":"Ethereum documentation describes validators staking ETH and checking or proposing blocks. Misbehaviour can lead to destruction of staked ETH. These descriptions identify a security role for ETH but do not measure today’s validator concentration, independent operators, software diversity, realized rewards or resilience.","observedAt":"2026-10-04T20:49:32.891Z","sha256":"54450f20b10562f7b1094f3ba79aee51512206e45aeccabb636e1c533a70f9cd"},{"id":"eth-eip1559","title":"EIP-1559: pinned fee market specification","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/ba6c342c23164072adb500c3136e3ae6eabff306/EIPS/eip-1559.md","summary":"The pinned EIP-1559 specification describes execution gas fees: the priority fee is capped at maxFee minus baseFee, the base portion is burned, and unused gas is refunded at the effective gas price. For ongoing blocks the target is half the parent gas limit, with integer base-fee adjustment using denominator 8 and a minimum upward increment of 1. Initial fork handling is different. This historical specification uses miner terminology; current validator roles are described separately by Ethereum proof-of-stake documentation. Blob fees, issuance and current network observations are outside this calculation. Original Cryptosnif arithmetic (platform-mechanisms-1), all hypothetical: gas used 21000, gas limit 30000, base fee 30 gwei, max fee 40 gwei and max priority fee 2 gwei give total 672000000000000 wei (0.000672 ETH), burned 630000000000000 wei (0.000630 ETH) and priority 42000000000000 wei (0.000042 ETH). The refund for 9000 unused gas is 288000000000000 wei (0.000288 ETH), excluding any other refund mechanism. One gwei equals 1000000000 wei; one ETH equals 10^18 wei. At parent base fee 30 gwei, parent gas limit 30000000 and target 15000000, the next base fee is 33.75 gwei after a full parent block and 26.25 gwei after an empty one. These inputs are examples and no present fees or net ETH issuance are inferred.","observedAt":"2026-10-04T20:49:32.890Z","sha256":"4460ad966a22d8501e12d75165c2c784c61748d8128229f115ebac1bfccac59f"}],"review":{"scope":"documentation","changes":["{\"section\":1,\"from\":\"an offchain governance model\",\"to\":\"an offchain governance model (discussion and decisions outside the blockchain)\"}","{\"section\":1,\"from\":\"the 2016 DAO response\",\"to\":\"the 2016 response concerning the DAO application\"}","{\"section\":4,\"from\":\"One gwei\",\"to\":\"1 gwei\"}","{\"section\":4,\"from\":\"One ETH\",\"to\":\"1 ETH\"}","{\"section\":6,\"sourceCorrection\":\"Attach documentary sources to the mechanism summary in the verdict.\"}"]}}}